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Abstract 
In his text L’étourdit, Lacan develops a tripartite definition of the equivocal, 
distinguishing between the homophonic, grammatical, and logical. Psychoanalysis, being 
the praxis of alleviating unconscious symptoms via the semblance that is language, 
depends upon the equivocity of language. This paper elucidates these three forms of 
ambiguity in their relevance to the clinic and the end of analysis. 
 
 
Introduction  
How does one define the equivocal in its relation to psychoanalysis? From a Freudian 
point of view, parapraxes, dreams, symptoms, and bungled actions first come to mind in 
that they all suppose compromise formations. Yet even speech without lapses remains 
equivocal. On the basis of the presumption that the equivocal is to be studied at the 
frontier of linguistics and psychoanalysis, a dictionary can be used and definitions 
support the research. According to the Oxford Dictionary (2010, p. 593), one finds the 
following definition: “An expression capable of having more than one meaning; a pun. 
The fact of having more than one meaning; ambiguity”. 
 
Insofar as the term concerns the field of psychoanalysis, we propose to use the three final 
definitions found in the Littré (2007): “equivocal rhyme”, “interpretations of double 
entente” and “wordplay or calembour”. In other words, the equivocal refers to when the 
nature of language reveals itself in the ambiguous, arbitrary relation between signifier and 
signified; when the signifying chain diverges simultaneously towards two or more 
meanings. 
 
The importance of the equivocal as a foundational concept appears discretely throughout 
Freud’s written works. Indeed it is pivotal in the development of his hypothesis of the 
unconscious. “Freud’s interest in the assumption [of the unconscious] was never a 
philosophical one - though, no doubt, philosophical problems inevitably lay just round 
the corner. His interest was a practical one. He found that without making that 
assumption he was unable to explain or even to describe a large variety of phenomena 
which he came across” (Freud, 2001b, p. 162). Furthermore, he learns from his patients 
that mutual contradiction is absent from the unconscious, perhaps most clearly in the case 
of dreams. “Dreams are disconnected, they accept the most violent contradictions without 
the least objection, they admit impossibilities, they disregard knowledge which carries 
great weight with us in the daytime, they reveal us as ethical and moral imbeciles” 
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 Correspondence 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 article 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(Freud, 2001c, p. 87). One could thus say that equivocity is characteristic of the 
unconscious. 
 
The equivocal is a topic that Lacan emphasized considerably in his last period, especially 
from 1972 on with his indispensable text, L’étourdit. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous 
to imagine that the equivocal doesn’t appear in Lacanian theory prior to the seminar 
Encore. Already in 1953, at the time of his first “Rome Discourse”, a monumental 
structuralist manifesto2, Lacan spoke about the equivocal in the symbolic register and its 
essential place in the analytic cure. In this discourse we find the following reference 
where he accentuates the importance of the letter in the analytic praxis. For Miller 
(2011a), the future importance of savoir lire, which will be central from Radiophonie on, 
is already announced: 
 
 
Here the letter of the message is what’s important. To seize it, one must stop an instant 
at the fundamentally equivocal character of speech, insofar as the function is as much 
one of concealing as of discovering. But even adhering to what the letter makes 
known, the nature of language does not permit the isolation of resonances which 
always indicate its reading along several significances. It is this inherent partition in 
the ambiguity of language that alone explains the multiplicity of possible entrances to 
the secret of speech. It remains there is only one text for which what is said and what 
is left unsaid can be read at once, and it is to this text that the symptoms are bound as 
intimately as a rebus to the phrase in which it figures (Lacan, 2001e, 140). 
 
From the beginning of Lacan’s seminars in the 1950’s there is an emphasis on the pre-
eminence of the letter3 as being the only way to grasp the essence of the analytic 
                                                2  The Rome Discourse  and  corresponding  article, Function  and  field  of  Speech  and 
Language in Psychoanalysis, constitute a response both to continual pressure for his exclusion from the SPP on the part of the IPA which came to a head earlier that year, as well  as  the  authoritarian  approach  of  his  analyst,  Rudolph  Lowenstein  and  his lover, Marie Bonaparte. 3  It  is  essential  not  to  forget  that  Lacan’s  definition of  the  letter  changes  over  the course of his teaching. If in 1957, with the publication of L’instance de la lettre, the summit of an era of the pre‐eminence of the symbolic, one finds,  “By  ‘letter’  I  designate  the  material  medium  (support)  that  concrete  discourse borrows  from  language”  (Lacan, 1966b, p. 495). The definition of  the  letter  in  the final  Lacan,  e.g.,  Lituraterre,  is  hardly  the  same.  There,  the  letter  constitutes  the shore  between  the  real  and  semblance:  “Between  centre  and  absence,  between knowledge  and  jouissance,  there  lies  the  littoral  that  only  fetches  to  the  literal provided you are able to take this very same bend at all times” (2001b, p. 16). 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experience, of correctly reading the instance of the letter in subject’s unconscious on his 
vocalizations. As Lacan proposes, the flexible relation between signifier and signified in 
speech and the abundant existence of homophones contribute to the fundamentally 
equivocal character of speech. If we take the Two Ronnies Hardware Shop sketch as an 
example, one quickly sees that the ambiguity of whether one said Four candles or fork 
handles, or even fork and hells needs the written letter be avoided. Lacan continues, 
however, asserting that such an “isolation of references”, a reduction of possible 
significations for a given signifier or chain of signifiers, is not always possible simply 
through the written letter. Such is the case with Kuno Susumi’s famous experiment, in 
which he requests a computer program to give him the signification for the English 
sentence, time flies like an arrow (Kuno, 1970). In this case, written language offers little 
help in reducing the plethora of potential meanings beyond the exclusion of homophones; 
for Lacan, the nature of language doesn’t permit an absolute reduction of ambiguity. Here 
he references language because even when written, language remains equivocal, though 
admittedly less so than speech. A minimal sentence, time flies, could be understood in at 
least four different ways. The unspoken axiom of Lacan’s assertion is that the 
unconscious is structured like a language, and furthermore is a combinatory of 
metonymic fragments and letters, an extreme hypothesis that Serge Leclaire (1998) 
helped to corroborate with the formalization of his Dream with the Unicorn. 
 
This attention to the letter continues throughout Lacan’s teaching and his varied attempts 
to raise psychoanalysis to the dignity of science.4 Indeed, the letter proves to be 
primordial to the Lacanian approach. Even if, in Seminar XXI, when Lacan announces a 
new ethic, The unfooled err5, he founds this axiom in the confidence of the spoken, the 
savoir lire lauded by Miller (2011a) situates itself at the level of the letter and not the 
acoustic image conceptualized by Saussure. In his 2006-2007 Lacanian Orientation, 
Miller professes “Last year, thrice I found myself remarking on, and not in the manner of 
a feint, the distance I took, or rather that this I which speaks to you, itself took from 
Lacanian disance: distance and distance.6 I said disance... That which saves, will save us 
from disance, I will say it: reading and reading to the letter” (Miller, 2012, p. 17). 
 
But more specifically, this quotation indicates the direction to be taken when interpreting 
the “fundamentally equivocal character” of speech. Lacanian analysis aims not at 
meaning of the analysand’s speech or the generation of new meaning: e.g., “I know what 
you really mean to say”. Such an endeavour would be condemned to perpetual 
misunderstanding. Rather it directs itself towards the underlying interplay of letters of the 
unconscious. If “there is only one text where one can read at once what is said and 
unsaid”, would this text would be the unconscious? Or lalangue? It would be best not to 
confuse the polysemous series of possible meanings of a given phrase and the 
fundamentally univocal nature of the presence of a certain signifier or letter. Let us 
imagine a patient telling us the following, “I dreamt of a woman, I can not be sure who it 
was, but I know it was not my mother”. It is at the level of the materiality of the signifier 
“mother” that there is no equivoque, not at the level of signification. And so, the analytic 
ethic espoused in this paragraph of Lacan’s first Rome Discourse (1956) does not consist 
in grappling with the production of meaning; it is not a case of explaining symptoms, 
                                                4  Initially  via  the  structural  linguistics  of  Saussure  and  Jakobson,  then  the  formal logic of Russell and Gödel, and finally topology with Klein, Soury, Thom, and Thomé. 5 Les non­dupes errent. 6 Disance being a synonym for lexicon, similar to jargon. 
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which would approach a delusion of interpretation. Rather it is a case of fidelity to the 
letter in its materiality. From here one can see that “Interpretation is not open to any and 
all meanings”. The quote continues, “The fact that I have said that the effect of 
interpretation is to isolate in the subject a kernel, a kern, to use Freud’s own term, of non-
sense, does not mean that interpretation is in itself nonsense... It has the effect of bringing 
out an irreducible signifier. One must interpret at the level of the s, which is not open to 
all meanings, which cannot be just anything, which is a signification, though no doubt 
only an approximate one”, says Lacan in his Seminar XI (1990, p. 250). Lacanian 
interpretation is at the level of the repetitive presence of a signifier or letter, and so the 
interpretation is just or proper insofar as it does not lead to a proliferation of meaning, to 
the establishment of a delusion of signification. An interpretation oriented by meaning 
will never reduce the excess of meaning.7 This is the “bedrock of castration” Freud 
(Freud, 2001d) grappled with. As such, the only right interpretation would be that which 
dilutes meaning, which rests true to the letter.8 
 
Later Lacan elaborated further on this “fundamentally equivocal character”, the polysemy 
of intentionality of the phrase in his notion of lying, misleading truth.9 The lying truth 
constitutes the wall of the nature of enunciation itself, up against which all discourse 
stumbles. One can never tell the whole truth, regardless the judicial imperative “Swear to 
tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing by the truth”; in its geometric consistency, a 
facet of the truth escapes any utterance. As such, the lying truth is clearly more radical 
than what could be called the veracious lie10 — a concept Lacan passes by ephemerally in 
                                                7  As  such  psychoanalytic  interpretation  is  perhaps  a  misnomer.  It  has  little  in common  with  legal  interpretation  in  which  judges  wrestle  with  the  appropriate signification  of  a  text.  Psychoanalytic  interpretation  more  resembles  oracular speech, oracular speech that aims for the discovery of the text of the unconscious. 8 An analysand says he told a coworker how much money he spends on fashion, and yet  how  difficult  it  is  to  spend money  on  analysis.  The  analyst  interprets  from  a position of surprise: “You told her all that?” Next session, “I thought about what you said, I think you’re jealous”. End of the session, the analyst’s punctuates based on the analysand’s  fantasy.  The  analysand  returns  and  speaks  of  how  much  money  he spends on substances during parties and how he shares because he “doesn’t want to be taken as someone who counts”. The analyst echoes “You don’t want to be taken as someone  who  counts?”  This  declaration  possesses  a  clear  equivoque  between  a miserly subject and one of importance. Next session, the patient tells of a traumatic childhood  separation  from  another  placed  at  the  level  of  imaginary  and  symbolic identification. He describes  the  separation,  “It was exactly  like  coming down  from ecstasy... Have you taken ecstasy?” Here the analyst does not respond with yes or no, nor drugs are bad for you or any other of the myriad of possible platitudes. Instead he  says,  “This  is  something  which  counts  for  you”.  The  vignette  shows  how psychoanalytic interpretation bases itself neither on morality, nor on the knowledge of the psychoanalyst, it is based on the materiality of language. The equivocal term found  in  the  analysand’s  speech  is,  in  this  case,  the  fulcrum  for  the  installation  of transference, of the subject supposed to know.  9 La vérité menteuse 10  “But,  certainly,  it  is  in  the  space of  the Other that he  sees himself  and  the point from which he looks at himself is also in that space. Now, this is also the point from which he speaks, since in so far as he speaks, it is in the locus of the Other that he 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his Seminar XI, when he pays homage to the poet Aragon who “in the 60s had formulated 
something he called the mentir-vrai... The true lie is an untruth which attains, which 
reveals truth” (Miller, 2011c, p. 140). Simply put, its another name for Einfall, the 
phenomena that no matter what one speaks of, one will, or rather one’s subject will 
pronounce, quite possibly unbeknownst to the ego, a Kern of truth on the nature of his 
trauma by language. The lying truth is something entirely different, qua “the truth itself is 
a lie” (ibid.). 
 
Les Tours Dit: Lacan’s definition of the equivocal 
Homophony 
In this great oracular text the early 1972s, Lacan divides the equivocal into a tripartite 
classification: homophonic, grammatical, and logical. Regarding homophonic equivocity, 
Lacan writes, “I begin with homophony, - whence depends orthography. The fact that in 
the language which is mine, which I played on above, “deux” [two] be equivocal with 
“d’eux” [of them/their], guards a trace of this soul game by which make two-together of 
them finds its limit in “make two” of them. One finds others in this text, from parêtre to 
s’emblant” (Lacan, 2001c, p. 491). To demonstrate the equivocity of spoken languages, 
he refers to the myriad of signifiers of the French language who share the phoneme dø. 
The French language is particularly resonant at the level of homophony; “Thank God the 
French language, often ambiguous when spoken” (Lacan, 1981, p. 307) provides 
countless examples in stride: e.g., vers/vert/verre/ver, ou/où/août/hou/houx, and 
sans/s’en/c’en/sens/sent/sang/cent. Yet, the French language is hardly unique in this 
regard, in that it possesses so very many homonyms. Upon a quick glance at English one 
finds: air/are/e’er/ere/err/heir or boar/Boer/boor/bore. Such equivoques are assuredly 
present in all human languages; A fortiori by approaching the question of language from 
Gödel’s discoveries on the incompatibility in all formal systems of completeness and 
consistence, arise the striking realization that it is fundamentally impossible to have a 
univocal language. In order for a language to be without ambiguity, there must be a 
unique sign for each and every thing in the universe, and a system with one sign for every 
object wouldn't truly be a human language but rather a code of signs. There would be no 
signifiers in the psychoanalytic sense since though “the sign is something that represents 
something for somebody, but the signifier is something that represents a subject for 
another signifier” (Lacan, 1970, p. 194). The signifier is not the bearer of the sense of the 
object, “but rather something of the order of a mark applied in some manner on the 
object, which superimposes it” (Lacan, 1960-1961).11 The only human artefact remotely 
                                                                                                                                       begins to constitute that truthful lie by which is initiated that which participates in desire at the level of the unconscious” (Lacan, 1990, p. 144).    11  Lacan  derived  such  definitions  from  Saussure’s  work  on  the  phonic  chain  and Jakobson’s  research  into  aphasia,  deducing  a  fundamental  separation  between sound and idea. For Saussure, the sign is the combination of sound image and idea. Jakobson’s major advance was  the discovery  that  the  signifier or phoneme can be without  signified.  In  the  New  World,  Charles  Sanders  Peirce  instead  termed  the signifier a representamen,  the  referent  as object,  and named  the meaning  that one obtains  from a sign the interpretant. More  importantly,  the relation between  ‘sign‐user’  or  receiver  and  sign  is  one  of  negotiation  with  the  receiver  deciding  one meaning from nigh infinite possibilities. Such a perspective, that the signified is not 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capable such of formalization would be mathematics, which, though a human language, is 
not a language of acoustic images but rather a highly formalized one with fixed 
meanings. Furthermore, Gödel proved that any even formal systems based in 
mathematics would always be incomplete, always pas tout. The “fundamentally 
equivocal character” of language need not arise from a human limitation, being the result 
of logical impossibility. 
 
A posteriori, the decrease in phoneme perceptiveness in infants (Pons, F. et al., 2009) 
renders inevitable the equivocity of language. Around the end of the first year of life, the 
total range of sounds produced by the child begins to diminish from a Babel of phonemes 
limited only by physiology to the more restricted set of sounds heard in the language of 
its entourage. Gödel’s impossibility aside, such a poor selection of sounds, limited first 
by human anatomy, and then by the newborn’s exposure to language will not be able 
avoid homophony and synonymy. And we have not yet considered the ambiguities of a 
given message in relation to where one places the cuts between sounds to form words, 
e.g., novio vs. no vio. The serious researcher will undoubtedly find formal incoherencies 
in all human languages; all spoken languages possess equivocity. 
 
Another Lacanian example of a homophonic equivoque is to be found in the binary “tu es 
celui qui me suivra partout” vs. “tu est celui qui me suivra(s) partout”. Naturally, the 
ambiguity between the simple future and the imperative future tenses only clarifies itself 
through writing, through the supplemental letter. This ambiguity at the level of speech 
reflects the unconscious desire of the subject of enunciation. 
 
There is an underlying I to the “ You are the one who will follow me [“Tu es celui qui me 
suivras partout”] on which I insisted to such an extent.12 It inscribes itself, with the 
whole problem of a certain future, at the interior of the vocatives properly speaking, the 
vocatives of vocation. For those who were not there, I recall the difference there is in 
French - it is a finesse whose demonstration not all tongues permit - between “You are 
the one who shall follow me ” and “ you are the one who will follow me”, [Tu es celui 
qui me suivras partout and Tu es celui qui me suivra partout], without s. In this occasion, 
the difference of the performative power of the You is effectively an actual difference of 
the I inasmuch as it operates in this act of speaking. One clearly sees at this level that the 
subject always receives his own message in an inverted form, namely it is the I to avow 
itself here by the intermediary of the form it gives to the You... Nevertheless, 
fundamentally what one finds at the second floor13 [d arrow $<>a], is a call of the being 
                                                                                                                                       the same as the message, is confirmed in the field of psychopathology. In delusions of interpretation as found in paranoia and erotomania, the chain signifier may lead unproblematically to significations, but the true meaning is the exclusive property of the subject, (s)he deduces a message, often menacingly, directed to his person. We take as a given that a signifier or signifying chain can signify one of many ‘signifieds’. Beyond  this,  it need have no  relation whatsoever  to  the meaning ascribed  to  it by the receiver. Umberto Eco (1990) names this hermetic semiosis, explaining “from a 
certain  point  of  view  everything  bears  relationships  of  analogy,  contiguity,  and 
similarity to everything else”, but the phenomena of certainty and universal unicity of meaning in delusions of interpretations seem beyond even hermetic semiosis. 12 First found in Seminar III. 13 Of the graph of desire. 
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emitted more or less forcefully. It always contains, more or less, a Let it be14, and there, 
once again, one of the marvellous homophonic equivoques that French contains. (Lacan, 
2013, p. 46). 
 
This homophonic equivoque explicitly demonstrated by Lacan plays on the finesse of the 
French language, on the distinction between certainty of the future and the causality of 
the invocatory future; this ambiguity returns to the subjective position of (s)he who 
accounts for subject of enunciation, to the “underlying I” (Jakobson, 1971, p 132).15 The 
signification swings back and forth between stringency, plausibly from a universal 
observation - little matter which other - and the election of a singular other. One might 
say the meaning of the phrase oscillates between the sacrament of marriage and 
persecution. 
 
“The appeal of the being”, which would be located at the second level of the graph of 
desire, involves the desire of the subject of the unconscious. The being - there, in Seminar 
XI, Lacan still uses this term (l’être) as though it referred to a being with consistence16 - 
emits “full speech” (Lacan, 1988, p. 107)17 via through its enunciations. This “appeal to 
the other” resides between the suivra of recognition or perhaps exasperation and the 
suivras of exigency; one hears the desire articulated in its relation to the fantasy, the 
delusion, formalized as follows: d→$<>a. Hence the affirmation, the desire of the subject 
makes itself heard in the space between the pronounced words, in the equivoques present. 
Here the psychoanalyst interprets; (s)he interprets based on the fantasy, the fantasy of the 
analysand, of course! It is precisely here that the famous ego-psychologists like 
Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein lose their bearings, believing they should interpret using 
their own fantasies, as though they could offer themselves as anchoring points for the 
madman. In that case, it is suggestion instead of psychoanalysis, the imposition of the 
analyst’s fantasy, of his subjectivity upon the analyst. 
 
Addressing the homophonic equivoque, Lacan goes even further, saying that if the 
listener, the receiver in question has not acquired “something that represents a knot, a 
clamping point in a bundle of significations... he will hear you are the one who shall 
follow me everywhere” (1981, p. 316), meaning a persecutory delusion. If there is not a 
certain suture between signifier and signified, something fulfilling the function of the 
                                                14 Soit: The subjunctive tense of être; the conjunction “soit... soit” / “either... or”; an affirmation of accordance “So be  it” or “That being so”; an equivalent of “that  is  to say” or “namely”, in mathematics “Soit l’équation y=x+a”/ “Let y=x+a”. 15 According to Jakobson, a shifter is a term whose meaning can only be deduced by referring to the message communicated between the sender and receiver. 16 Throughout Lacan’s  teaching,  in accordance with his  renouncement of ontology which gives way to henology, the term gradually changes from being to subject, and finally to parlêtre.   17 “Full speech  is speech which aims at, which  forms,  the truth such as  it becomes established in the recognition of one person by another. Full speech is speech which performs [qui fait acte]. One of the subjects finds himself, afterwards, other than he was before. That is why this dimension cannot be evaded in the analytic experience” (Lacan, 1966b).  “Full  speech,  in effect,  is defined by  its  identity with  that which  it speaks about”. 
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maintaining the metaphoric structure of language, then the accentuation of equivocal 
enunciations will not be without risk. 
 
Grammar 
The second modality of the equivocal addressed by Lacan in L’étourdit is the 
grammatical equivoque. 
 
For interpretation is seconded here by grammar. To which, in this case as in others, 
Freud does not deprive himself of recourse. I do not return here to what I underscore 
in this practice confirmed in many examples. I stress only that it is there what analysts 
impute modestly to Freud as a slippage in the indoctrination. This has dates (cf. that of 
the rat man) when he had no more backdrop for proposing them than the system ψ 
prey to “internal incitations”. Thus the analysts who cling to the madhouse of “general 
psychology”, are not capable of reading, in these startling cases, that Freud made 
subjects “repeat their lesson,” in their own grammar. To the extent that he repeats for 
us that, from each of their statements, we must be ready to revise the “parts of 
discourse” that we have believed to be able to retain from precedents. Of course this is 
what linguists propose to themselves as an ideal, but if it appear-to-be (parest) 
propitious to Chomsky, I have marked that my first sentence is inscribed as a 
contradiction by equivoque countering his transformational tree. “I am not making you 
say it”. Is this not the minimum of interpretive intervention? But it is not its sense that 
matters in the formula that the language I use here permits to give to it, it is that the 
amorphology of a language opens the equivoque between “You said it” and “I take it 
all the less to my charge as, such a thing, I in no way made you say it” (Lacan, 2001c, 
p. 491-2). 
 
Freudian interpretation is not limited uniquely to homophonic ambiguities; he “makes 
subjects ‘repeat their lesson’, in its grammar”, in the grammar of their drives. Freud 
makes his patients learn from their repetitions indeed, and long before his text of 1914 
Erinnern, Wiederholen und Durcharbeiten. Lacan continues his elaboration, indicating 
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that the kernel of psychoanalytic interpretation can be reduced to a minimalist indication 
of the analysand’s own position as a sui generis cause, a “I didn’t make you say it”. You 
yourself pronounced that without any exhortation on my part. The famous example from 
the case of Ida Bauer comes to mind. When she complains emphatically of the hypocrisy 
of her entourage and her objectification as an item to be bartered, Freud interprets, “Look 
to you’re own role in the disorder which you bemoan” (Lacan, 1966a). This interpretation 
relies on grammatical equivocity, insofar as it opens access to truth of the grammar of the 
drive. And thus one can distinguish between interpretations on the equivocity of the 
grammar of the drive, and on the equivocity of the grammar of the dire that “remains 
forgotten behind what is said in what is heard” (Lacan, 2001c). First we will consider the 
grammar of speech before turning to the grammar of the drive. As the reduced core of 
interpretation, Lacan proposes a fundamental, je ne te le fais pas dire. The function of 
this minimal interpretation is one of decontextualising what was said, in order to allow 
new meaning to emerge (Miller, 1996; Leclaire, 1998). Even in Lacan’s formulation, it 
does not only involve a simple indication with regard to the analysand’s speech. There is 
ambiguity, a certain oracular nature to the analyst’s interpretation; it is not clear if it is a 
more or less neutral indication, or rather an accentuation: I didn’t make you say that, I 
didn’t make you say that, I didn’t make you say that, I didn’t make you say that, etc. 
Lacan observes that the very absence of emphasis leaves the ambiguity open, leaves the 
act of joining signifier and signification undone. In this example one finds a slippage of 
meaning between the identity of the cause, coercion, the frontier of utterance, and an 
evaluation of the preceding speech. The equivoque “is seconded by grammar” because all 
of these connotations do not found their ambiguity in the indeterminacy between a 
singular acoustic image18 and a plurality of words to which it may refer, but insofar as the 
accentuation of one of several signifiers in the sentence modifies the meaning, without 
any need of exchanging one homonym for another. Thus Lacan names the “amorphology 
of a language” (Blum, 2005), the monotone and homogenous nature of an enunciation 
which leaves the connotations at the level of the phrase undetermined, grammatical 
equivocity. As such, the grammatical equivoque remains distinct from the homophonic or 
logical. But, as mentioned above, the amorphology of a language is in no way the only 
manifestation of grammatical equivocity in the analytic experience. 
 
During the 2014 AE soiree on the equivocal, Eric Laurent asked the auditorium - seeing 
how the definitions of homophonic and logical equivoques were evident enough - “what 
would be an example of grammatical equivocity?” Of an equivoque that does not rely 
uniquely on the sonorous poverty of all human languages, nor on the logical negation 
inherent to the end of psychoanalysis. Perhaps the simplest answer would be the pronoun. 
The pronoun and the ambiguity it can engender offer at least one clear example of 
grammatical equivocity. In the case of the pronoun, it does not strictly speaking involve 
                                                18 “The linguistic sign unites not a thing and a name, but a concept and an acoustic image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychic imprint of this sound, the representation which gives us the evidence of our senses; it  is  sensorial,  and  if we  happen  to  call  it  ‘material’,  it  is  only  in  this  sense  and  in opposition to the other term of  the association,  the concept, usually more abstract [...] I call the combination of a concept and a sound image a sign, but in current usage the term generally designates only a sound‐image, a word, for example (arbor, etc.). One  tends  to  forget  that arbor  is  called  a  sign  only  because  it  carries  the  concept ‘tree’, with the result that the idea of the sensory part implies the idea of the whole” (Saussure, 1916, p. 418). 
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homophonic equivocity; there is no abundance of possible words indicated by a single 
acoustic image, but rather a fundamental variability, a vacuity of signified, variability 
essential to the very function of the pronoun. Jean-Claude Milner (1982) writes 
extensively on the topic of grammatical equivoques in his works on the anaphor19, 
ἀναφορά being a figure of style, which consists in beginning verses, phrases, or larger 
syntactical groupings by the same word or syntagma. We are principally interested in the 
manifestations of anaphors that involve pronouns. Before advancing further, let us clarify 
the difference between co-reference and anaphor - especially since, in French, the term 
anaphor is defined in two divergent meanings.20 
 
 
Presently, it appears that many discussions concerning linguistic identity can be taken 
up anew. Traditionally, one distinguishes the relation of two referential units into 
categories of identity of reference and lexical identity. The first is nothing other than 
actual co-reference: it implies the material identity of the designated segments (when 
these have substance), but not those of the designating linguistic units [e.g., Un train 
peut en cacher un autre]. The second [anaphora] is more complex: for these linguistic 
units, the lexical identity is the lexical material itself: nothing more, nothing less. But, 
due to the inexistence of absolute lexical synonymy, when it is a case of nouns, virtual 
co-reference is tantamount to lexical identity. They are not the same concept, however: 
so, in strict terminology, it would be false to maintain that pronominal anaphora 
                                                19  For  the  purposes  of  our  discussion  on  the  relation  between  anaphor  and grammatical  equivocity,  perhaps  a  clarification  of  the  definition  of  “anaphor” imposes  itself.  In  this way we  hope  to  limit,  at  least  to  reduce  the  ambiguities  of terminology, comically recursive in relation to the topic of this chapter. According to Jean‐Claude  Milner,  co­reference  and  anaphorisation  are  two  distinct  concepts : “There is a relation of co‐reference between to referential unities, A and B, when it so happens that they have they refer to the same thing ‐ which can arise, without the interpretation  of  one  being  affected  by  the  interpretation  of  the  other.  [...]  The relation  is  manifestly  symmetrical  and  transitive;  To  consider  it  reflexive  is  not devoid of sense:  one referential unity could be said to be co‐referential to itself. [...] The relation of the anaphor, however, is an asymmetrical relation, existing between a first anaphorised term and a second anaphorising term”. (Milner, 1982, p. 32). 20 “In English, the name of the pertinent class is anaphor, the name anaphora being reserved  for  the  relation  and  not  one  of  its  terms.  The  French  language  does  not permit such a distinction [though adopting these words to the lexica would suffice]; the name anaphor  is  thus  ‘ambiguous and  it depends upon the context  to manifest whether it refers to the relation or to the term of the relation” (Milner, 1982, p. 32). 
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suppose lexical identity, since, by principle, a noun and a pronoun are materially (and 
lexically) distinct. But one could say that, in general, the pronoun must have the same 
virtual reference as its antecedent; sometimes, this is even the only, the unique relation 
that establishes it. By abuses of language, to the extent that the virtual reference is 
attached - in the case of nouns - to there lexical specificity, one would say the pronoun 
adopts the lexical unity: for example, such is the point of view of Gross (1973), 
according to whom en, points to the unit lions [I saw ten lions and you saw fifteen of 
them]. One can see how the formula is justifiable, but also how imprecise it is (Milner, 
1982, p. 32).21 
 
In simple co-reference, it is a case of two signifiers that designate the same signified. 
Simply put, they are synonyms. Milner provides the example, one train may hide another 
[un train peut en cacher un autre], The first train can hide a second train, signified here in 
French by the word, en; there is an identity of references. So we have two different words 
indicating one same actual reference - two distinct references which are equal. The two 
co-referents will never have exactly the same connotations, since so long as they are not 
the same signifier, they do not have the same signifying materiality, (Lacan, 1998b, p. 
33)22 but they aim more or less for the same signified. 
                                                21 «Il apparaît enfin que bien des discussions touchant l’identité linguistique peuvent à 
présent  être  reprises  sur  nouveaux  frais.  Il  est  de  tradition  de  distinguer,  pour  deux 
unités  référentielles,  entre  l’identité  des  références  et  l’identité  lexicale.  La  première 
n’est  rien  d’autre  que  la  coréférence  actuelle  :  elle  implique  l’identité matérielle  des 
segments désignés (lorsque ceux­ci ont une substance), mais non pas celle des unités 
linguistiques  désignantes  [e.g.,  Un  train  peut  en  cacher  un  autre].  La  seconde 
[l’anaphore]  est plus  complexe  :  elle­même,  l’identité  lexicale  est  l’identité matérielle 
des unités linguistiques : rien de plus, rien de moins. Mais, à cause de l’inexistence de la 
synonymie  lexicale  absolue,  l’identité  lexicale  et  la  coréférence  virtuelle  s’équivalent, 
quand il s’agit des noms. Elles ne sont cependant pas le même concept : ainsi, en stricte 
terminologie, il serait faux de soutenir que l’anaphore pronominale suppose l’identité 
lexicale,  puisque,  par  principe,  un  nom  et  un  pronom  sont  matériellement  (et 
lexicalement) distincts. Mais on peut dire que,  dans  la généralité des  cas,  le  pronom 
doit avoir  la même  référence  virtuelle que  son antécédent  ;  parfois,  c’est même  là  la 
seule  et  unique  relation  qui  s’établisse.  Par  abus  de  langage,  dans  la  mesure  où  la 
référence virtuelle est attachée, pour les noms, à leur spécificité lexicale, on dira que le 
pronom  alors  reprend  l’unité  lexicale  :  tel  est  par  exemple  le  point  de  vue  de  Gross 
(1973), selon qui en, ‘désigne’ (points to) l’unité lions [j’ai vu dix lions et toi tu en as vu 
quinze].  On  voit  en  quel  sens  la  formule  est  justifiable,  mais  aussi  combien  elle  est 
imprécise » (Milner, 1982, p. 32). 22 Lacan showed in his comparison between abbatu and atterré. 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In the case of the anaphor, it is the lexical value which is identical across the various 
cases, and yet the signified differ. Here the pronoun offers a quintessential example of the 
anaphor. 
 
 
The traditional notion is that of a relation between two terms. From this point of view 
one distinguishes between a free anaphor, which is indifferent to the constraints to the 
specified subject and finite sentences, and a bound anaphor, which is dependent upon 
these constraints. The first relation results from discourse, insofar as it exceeds the 
limits of the sentence. The second relation results exclusively from the sentence: thus, 
a usual pronoun such as ‘he’ can have an antecedent situated in a distinct sentence, or 
even a different replica in a dialogue. The reflexive, on the other hand, can only have 
a term situated in the same sentence as an antecedent (Milner, 1982, p. 363).23 
 
Regarding the functioning of anaphoric pronouns, Jean-Claude Milner distinguishes 
between those of virtual reference and actual reference: “the segment of reality associated 
with a sequence is its actual reference; the ensemble of conditions characterizing a lexical 
entity is its virtual reference” (Milner, 1982, p. 32). In the case of the pronominal 
anaphor, one possibility is that the pronoun replaces a noun from a prior phrase; in such 
cases it would be called a bound anaphor. It can also be the case that the pronoun repeats 
itself throughout several phrases; in this case anaphor in question is free from any 
constraints of signification. Thus the pronominal anaphor gives an effect not without 
resemblance to that of paroemion, but at the level of the word instead of the letter. 
 
Concerning the clinic, the anaphorisation of a pronoun can incarnate the equivocal point 
between the subject of enunciation and the subject of the enounced. A married patient 
complains of a couple that are always arguing, “They shouldn’t have had a child” [ils 
n’auraient pas dû avoir un enfant], he says. If the analyst punctuates here, (s)he causes 
the ambiguity of the pronoun they to resonate. In French, there is a homophonic 
equivocity between Il and Ils, but let us consider the grammatical aspect of this free 
anaphor, the semantic flexibility of the word They instead. The cut, the analytic 
punctuation, causes the signified of the pronoun to vacillate. Does They refer to the other 
                                                23 «La notion traditionnelle est celle d’une relation entre deux termes. On distingue de ce point de vue entre une anaphore  libre, qui est  insensible aux contraintes du sujet  spécifié  et  des  phrases  finies,  et  une  anaphore  liée,  qui  est  sensible  à  ces contraintes.  La  première  relation  ressortit  au  discours,  en  tant  qu’il  excède  les limites de la phrase. La seconde relation ressortit exclusivement à la phrase : ainsi, 
un pronom usuel tel que ‘il’ peut avoir un antécédent situé dans une phrase distincte, 
ou même une  réplique différente dans un dialogue.  En  revanche,  le  réfléchi ne peut avoir  pour  antécédent  qu’un  terme  situé  dans  la même phrase »  (Milner,  1982,  p. 363). 
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couple, to the couple to which the subject of enunciation belongs, or even to the parental 
couple of the patient? As a result, the sentence in its ambiguity can be heard as an auto-
condemnation of the analysand himself. In this aspect, the equivoque of the pronominal 
anaphor approaches the example You are the one who will/shall follow me where if “a 
clamping point in a bundle of significations” lacks; the analyst’s interpretation could lead 
to attributing the equivoque to the unconscious, enigmatic desire of the analyst, e.g., “The 
analyst is going to confuse my remarks... The analyst is putting words in my mouth”. It’s 
an opening of the unconscious in which the unbearable desire of the subject is located, 
projected onto the body of the analyst. For this reason Miller reminds us of how the 
analyst works with fire; one should not forget the distinct possibility of engendering the 
spectre of the malevolent analyst. 
  
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, Lacan asserted that Freud made his 
patients “repeat their lesson”, meaning, learn the grammar of their drives. This is one 
reading of what Freud resumed in the phrase, Wo Es war, soll Ich warden (1923). This 
maxim highlights the analytic ethics of Freud, to bring into focus the grammar of the 
drive, of the jouissance of the analysand. 
 
 
I’m much more myself. Before, I was a para-me who thought of myself as the true one, 
and who was absolutely false. I think that no sentence is more appropriately expressed. 
It was absolutely false, this para-me. An I in the first part of the sentence, it has 
become an it in the second.... the Other is, therefore, the locus in which is constituted 
the I who is speaking with him who hears (Lacan, 1981, p. 307).24 
 
The vignette quoted by Lacan, the phrase that expresses itself justly, recounts the passage 
from a paramoi25 to a divided subject. It is difficult to imagine the subjective division 
between the identifications of the ego and the unconscious subject, of the alienation 
which the person undergoes as a result of his unconscious desire, and even of ego 
identifications being based in the locus which is the Other, as being more clearly spoken. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                24 «Je suis beaucoup plus moi. Avant j’étais un paramoi qui croyais être le vrai et qui était absolument faux’. Je pense qu’il n’y a pas de phrase qui s’exprime plus juste ; ça ne  sonne nullement à  côté, mais vous  sentez  bien  ce que  ‘l’absolument  faux’ n’est pas, ‘l’absolument faux’ ne colle pas. Il ‘était absolument faux’ ce paramoi. Il est un il dans la deuxième partie, et il est un je dans la première... L’Autre est donc le lieu où se constitue le je qui parle avec celui qui entend; ce que l’un dit étant déjà la réponse, et l’Atre décidant à l’entendre si l’un a ou non parlé» (Lacan, 1981, p. 307). 25 paramoi is either a neologism, or an obscure allusion to Hellinsia paramoi. 
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Logic 
 
Number 3 now: it is logic, without which interpretation would be stupid, the first to 
serve themselves of it being of course those who, to transcendentalise existence with 
the unconscious, arm themselves with Freud’s thesis that it is insensible to 
contradiction [Popper] (Lacan, 2001c, p. 492).  
  
Here Lacan alludes to the famous Popperian critique of psychoanalysis. Popper 
denounced psychoanalysis for as always being right; that the principle of treating denials 
as confirmation of the existence of the unconscious Vorstellung opens the door to 
irresolvable logical paradoxes. If the psychoanalyst is always right, then psychoanalysis 
can never attain the rigor of a science. This perspective is based in a certainty of the 
impossibility of induction. Popper writes, ”I approached the problem of induction through 
Hume. Hume, I felt, was perfectly right in pointing out that induction cannot be logically 
justified” (1963, p. 55). For Popper, no positive induction is certain; the only possible 
certainty follows the refutation of a theory via a negative result. Falsification thus 
functions for Popper as the indispensable criteria as to when a theory may be considered 
scientific. This absolute mistrust in the Other resonates with that of Descartes, of an 
Other, an untrustworthy God. One can see that “the absolute is always an affair of the 
impossible” (Miller, 2011b). For Popper, the absolute is the certainty of not knowing. All 
knowledge is never anything more than a fragile hypothesis awaiting the caprice of 
falsification. Hence Popper’s critique with respect to the concept of the unconscious, if it 
is never falsifiable, it cannot be scientific. If such a paradox were possible, it would 
threaten his certainty. 
 
 
It has no doubt not yet occurred to them that more than one logic has taken advantage 
of interdicting this fundament, and of no less remaining “formalized,” which means 
proper to the matheme (Lacan, 2001c, p. 492). 
 
Lacan does not directly respond to Popper’s critique at the level of the clinic, but he does 
address that critique via the history of mathematics, commenting on the apparent lack of 
perceptiveness of Popper and Hume, who have both failed to notice advances in 
mathematics, which demonstrate the fatality of contradiction (Fierens, 2002, p. 285).26 
Some examples among many include Lambert’s discoveries in non-Euclidian geometry 
and Gödel’s ever-famous proof. Gödel demonstrated that any formal system, any theory 
to use Popper’s lexicon, can never escape the fate of contradiction. Either the system is 
incomplete or it is inconsistent. We would add that inasmuch as the unconscious is 
                                                26 “Les logiques qui admettent plus de deux valeurs de vérité ou les logiques qui ne sont pas vérifonctionnelles (comme la logiqe modale ou la logique déontique) n’en reste pas moins formalisées” (Fierens, 2002, p. 285). 
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structured as a language, with a formal structure, it is unavoidable that it be incoherent. 
“To sum it up: exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process (mobility of 
cathexes), timelessness, and replacement of external by psychical reality - these are the 
characteristics which we may expect to find in processes belonging to the unconscious” 
(Freud, 2001b, p. 187).27 The symbolic unconscious is complete not in relation to the 
meaning of words, but due to the Vorstellung Representanz themselves, in their 
lexicality28; at the level of the real of their combinatory. For Lacan (1978, p. 122), the real 
is without lack?29 
 
 
Who would reproach Freud for such an effect of obscurantism and the dark clouds that 
it immediately, from Jung to Abraham, accumulated in response to him? Certainly not 
I who have also, to this place (of my inversion), some responsibilities (Lacan, 2001c, 
p. 492). 
 
Freud stayed the path of granting his creation, psychoanalysis, the dignity of science. At 
the end of the XIXth century, one finds his essays on aphasia and his famous unfinished 
letter to Fliess, titled: Entwurf. Indeed, he sustained his earliest scientific formation 
throughout his career; in the Studies on Hysteria, once again one finds the claim that 
psychoanalysis belongs to the sciences: “And no doubt yet other forms of this process 
exist, which are still concealed from our young psychological science; for it is certain that 
we have only taken the first steps in this region of knowledge, and our present views will 
be substantially altered by further observations” (1895, p. 262). This is still the case in the 
end, or at least until 1937 (1937a; 1937b). Moreover, Freud maintained this 
epistemological position despite the periodic departures of colleagues in disagreement 
with his theories.30 
 
So then, how can we understand Lacan’s attribution of obscurantism, to a response of 
obscurantism “from Jung to Abraham”, to Freud’s discovery? Dr. Carl Jung famously 
distanced himself from Freudian theory in 1914. Jung’s view on the nature and contents 
of the unconscious was becoming incompatible with Freud’s, and his conception of 
sexuality and libido differed from Freud’s.  
                                                27  In his Traumdeutung  (Interpretation of dreams, 2001c), one  finds the  following: “Dreams are disconnected, they accept the most violent contradictions without the least objection, they admit impossibilities, they disregard knowledge which carries great weight with us in the daytime, they reveal us as ethical and moral imbeciles”. 28 motérialité  29 “Le réel est sans fissure”. 30  Freud  begins  his  first  major  work  Instincts  and  their  vicissitudes  (1915a),  as follows: “We have often heard it maintained that sciences should be built upon clear and  sharply  defined  basic  concepts.  In  actual  fact  no  science,  not  even  the  most exact, begins with such definitions. The true beginning of scientific activity consists rather  in  describing  phenomena  and  then  in  proceeding  to  group  classify,  and correlate them”. 
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I can still recall vividly how Freud said to me, “My dear Jung, promise me never to 
abandon the sexual theory. That is the most essential thing of all. You see we must 
make a dogma of it, an unshakable bulwark”. He said that to me with great emotion, in 
the tone of a father saying, “And promise me this one thing, my dear son: that you will 
go to church every Sunday”. In some astonishment I asked him, “A bulwark -- against 
what?” To which he replied, “Against the black tide of mud” -- and here he hesitated 
for a moment, then added – “of occultism”. First of all, it was the words “bulwark” 
and “dogma” that alarmed me; for a dogma, that is to say, an indisputable confession 
of faith, is set up only when the aim is to suppress doubts once and for all. But that no 
longer has anything to do with scientific judgment; only with a personal power drive. 
This was the thing that struck at the heart of our friendship (Jung, 1961, p. 150).  
 
It seems difficult to disregard that this quotation be the allusion to which Lacan refers in 
L’étourdit. For Freud, the abandonment of the theory of libido constituted the fall into 
obscurantism. From this point, it is clear that Lacan has his own responsibilities for such 
obscurantism; during his retour à Freud, the application of structural linguistics to obtain 
L’inconscient est structuré comme un langage and the pre-eminence of reading symptoms 
to the letter, minimize the importance of libido and jouissance. 
 
After the schism, Jung’s theory (1978) developed into its own discipline with concepts 
such as the imagos, the collective unconscious, and the unus mundus31. In this way, 
Jung’s path passes from Freud’s focus on sexuality to a more encompassing, monistic 
definition of libido; for Jung, libido is psychic energy, “It is the energy that manifests 
itself in the life process and is perceived subjectively as striving and desire” (Ellenberger, 
1970, p. 697). 
  
As for Karl Abraham, it is curious that Lacan pairs him with Jung; how does the 
innovative author of the Liber Novus resemble the loyal disciple aside from their given 
name? Abraham never left Freud’s school of psychoanalysis (Freud, 1917). Rather he 
remained in the role of the ideal disciple. Moreover, he wrote extensively on sexual 
                                                31 “The unexpected parallelisms of ideas in psychology and physics suggest, as Jung pointed  out,  a  possible  ultimate one­ness  of  both  fields  of  reality  that  physics  and psychology  study  ‐  i.e.,  a  psychophysical  one‐ness  of  all  life  phenomena.  Jung was even  convinced  that  what  he  calls  the  unconscious  somehow  links  up  with  the structure  of  inorganic  matter  ‐  a  link  to  which  the  problem  of  so‐called “psychosomatic” illness seems to point. The concept of a unitarian idea of reality was called by Jung the unus mundus” (Jung, 1978, p. 309). 
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libido! In fact, when Abraham died tragically young on Christmas 1925, Freud wrote the 
following eulogy, “Among all those who followed me along the dark paths of 
psychoanalytic research, he won so preeminent a place that only one other name could be 
set beside his. It is likely that the boundless trust of his colleagues and pupils would have 
called him to the leadership; and he would without doubt have been a model leader in the 
pursuit of truth, led astray neither by the praise or blame of the many nor by the seductive 
illusion of his own fantasies” (1994, p. 101). Why then does Lacan locate Abraham on 
the side of obscurantism?  
  
Lacan’s attribution of obscurantism to Abraham found in L’étourdit only takes on 
meaning when read together with his previous condemnation of Erikson’s culturalism. 
Erik Erikson elaborated a theory for the chronologically progressive hierarchy of 
psychosexual stages (1956). In the 1950s, Lacan discredited Erikson’s theory of a 
hierarchical development of stages of ego development, proposing instead a theory of the 
ego as the contingent sum of all identifications as well as a shift in emphasis from the ego 
to the subject of the unconscious. 
  
In his seminar on March 9 1955, while speaking on the difficulties of regression theory, 
Lacan said the following of the cultural focus of Erikson’s theory.  
 
 
This so-called culturalism consists in emphasising in analysis those things, which in 
each case, depend on the cultural context in which the subject is immersed... You will 
be surprised to see that this culturalism converges quite singularly with a 
psychologism that consists in understanding the entire analytic text as a function of the 
various stages in the development of the ego... Unfortunately his culturalism isn’t a 
very useful tool for him. This culturalism obliges him to raise the so-called problem of 
the study of the manifest content of the dream. Erikson then sets up an entire theory of 
the different stages of the ego, with which I will acquaint you. These psychological 
diversions are certainly extremely instructive, but to me they seem in truth to go 
against the very spirit of Freudian theory. For, in the end, if the ego is this succession 
of emergences, of shapes, if this double face of good and evil, of realisations and 
modes of derealisations constitute its type, one fails to see what can be made of the 
fact that Freud states in a thousand, two thousand different places in his writings, 
namely that the ego is the sum of the identifications of the subject, with all that that 
implies as to its radical contingency (Lacan, 1978, p. 187).  
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The dwarfing of the radical decentring of the Freudian discovery, the closing of the 
traumatic discovery of subjective division behind the banality of the progressive 
development of the self, as seen in Piaget and Erikson’s theories, will eventually lead to 
an accentuation of the ego as exemplified in Ego psychology. Let us return to Abraham’s 
theoretical work. From 1907 to 1912, Abraham endeavoured to distinguish between 
hysteria and schizophrenia by their subjective constitution. Since both structures can 
involve body events - depersonalization, paralysis, psychosomatic symptoms, etc. - the 
theoretical differentiation between these two structures becomes difficult without the 
Freudian distinction Verdrängung vs. Verwerfung nor the Lacanian concepts the Name of 
the Father and phallic signification. After all, acquisition of language effects the nature of 
libido for all humans. “This body, when it incorporates the symbolic, this has an effect on 
its jouissance in Lacan’s sense” (Miller, 1983). The traces of language on the body is 
perhaps most clear in hysterical conversions that attests to the potential effects of the 
symbolisation of jouissance in the body. The hysteric bears witness with an imaginarily 
organised body, etched by words in a manner that has nothing to do with anatomy and 
physiology. For the schizophrenic, there are also body events, but not symptoms of 
metaphoric conversion as found in hysteria. Typically, these body events rest enigmatic, 
inaccessible to language. The schizophrenic’s body is not one organised as a constellation 
around a master signifier. Lacan (2001c) will explain that the “so-called schizophrenic” 
doesn’t enter into discourse since the phallus as an imaginary signifier is necessary to 
operate a separation between symbolic and real; this phallic signification is absent in 
schizophrenia32. And early as 1894, Freud had already significantly advanced the 
distinction between repression in hysteria or obsession, and “a much more energetic and 
successful kind of defence. Here, the ego rejects the incompatible idea together with its 
affect and behaves as if the idea had never occurred to the ego at all. But from the 
moment at which this has been successfully done the subject is in a psychosis, which can 
only be classified as hallucinatory confusion” (Freud, 1989, p. 15). Thus the notion of 
Verwerfung is already present in the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence as this “more energetic 
defence”, though he does not explicitly name this defence mechanism Verwerfung. Yet, 
Abraham, faced with the problematic of distinguishing between the cause of hysteria and 
schizophrenia, chooses to differentiate at the level of psychosexual constitution based in 
“a premature appearance of libido and also in pathological fantasies, which are 
prematurely engaged with sexual matters to the exclusion of all other conscious 
thoughts... Therefore these individuals never really surpassed infantile autoerotism. 
Objectal love never completely developed... The psychosexual constitution of dementia 
praecox thus rests on an inhibition of development” (1965, p. 32). For Abraham, the 
schizophrenic subject remains in an infantile autism at the level of the oral erogenous 
zone due to a developmental impasse. The correspondence between Freud and Abraham 
clarifies Freud’s reception of these ideas. For Freud, it is simply impossible to attribute an 
aetiology such as Abraham’s conception to psychosis since “this abnormal constitution is 
the general infantile constitution” (Abraham & Freud, 1969). Moreover, any analogy 
between psychotic autoeroticism and the so-called regression to infantile autoeroticism 
would be suspect seeing as “the detachment of libido [in the case of the psychotic] is 
almost always of a partial nature” (ibid.). Thus Freud rejected Abraham’s reduction of 
differential diagnosis to subjective evolution, to the condition of successful traversal of 
progressive stages. 
                                                32  “Ce  dont  le  dit  schizophrène  se  spécifie  d’être  pris  sans  le  secours  d’aucun discours établi” (Lacan, 2001c). 
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At the beginning of the twenties, Abraham theorised on the development of the ego, 
successful or abortive, in a progression through three stages - oral, anal, and genital - 
each with two sub-stages. Furthermore, he outlines this nosography of character as 
dependent upon the reception of the child by the maternal Other in each of these sub-
stages. From this hypothesis, Abraham writes the following, “It is now easy for us to 
circumscribe the task of an ideal therapy of melancholy. It would consist in lifting the 
libido’s regressive movements, and in labouring for its progression in the direction of a 
completed love for the object and genital organization” (Abraham , 1965, p. 208). 
 
Lacan’s criticism of Abraham will be multifaceted. With regard to melancholia, he 
disapproves of Abraham’s reductionism and the normative aims of treatment, as well as 
his conception of a hierarchic progression of stages. In opposition to the predominance of 
the undifferentiated object in Abraham’s theories, Lacan underlines the importance of 
Freud’s theory of castration. In Lacanian theory, it is more a question of the want-to-be 
than the object found wanting. In this way, Lacan follows Freud’s example, who, already 
in 1915, had written to Abraham, “Your observations on melancholia are precious... And 
yet you still pass by the veritable explanation” (Abraham & Freud, 1969). It is not simply 
that the arrival of psychoanalysis occurs at very specific historical coordinates, but its 
progress, and Lacan’s contribution is no exception, does also continually destabilise the 
semblance that spares us from the real. This other side of psychoanalysis reveals itself in 
the modification of other discourses via the destabilisation of semblance. An comparable 
event can be found in the text L’étourdit, where the complete lack of imaginary 
scaffolding, the pursuit of reducing semblance renders the text nearly indecipherable; the 
Lacanian definition of a writing, of an écrit, being “Not-For-Reading... Something like 
‘Beware of dog’, or ‘No trespassing’. Verily: Lasciate ogni speranza” (Lacan, 2001c). It 
consists in an effort to orient oneself towards the real, towards the pure logic of the 
signifier, as found in the unconscious. This short digression aside, Lacan returns to the 
theme of logical paradox. Theories of absolute falsifiability do not only encounter 
problems at the level of inherent contradiction in formal logic, the realm of logic has 
never escaped the paradoxical. 
 
I will recall only that no elaboration of logic, this beginning before Socrates and from 
elsewhere than our tradition, has ever proceeded except from a core of paradoxes, -for 
having served itself with a term, receivable everywhere, by which we designate the 
equivoques which situate themselves by this point which, for having come here as 
third, is also first and second. On what have I run aground this year in making felt the 
bath of Jouvence of which the matheme said logical has found for us its place and its 
vigour, are these the paradoxes not only refreshed from being promoted in new terms 
by Russell, but still original in coming from the dire of Cantor? (Lacan, 2001c, p. 
492). 
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This fundamentally contradictory nature of logic exists from long before Aristotle, indeed 
before Socrates. Lacan continues by referencing other traditions than ours, meaning those 
cultures who do not stem from the Judeo-Greco roots of occidental society. For Lao Tzu, 
the logic of his great work, the Tao Te Ching, founds itself in paradox, on a profound 
separation that would impede any and all access to the real by means of the symbolic. 
With regard to the philosophy of Socrates, one finds a similar foundation upon 
paradox.33 Further paradoxes found the henology of Parmenides and Zeno34 (Planck, 
1901). Moreover, one can hardly claim that the formalisation of modern physics has 
somehow reduced the scope of such paradoxes at the foundation of knowledge 
(Bekenstein, 1973)35. On the contrary, the advances of physics in the last century led to 
an eruption of the real, one directly in contradiction with Popper’s excessive 
simplification. Quantum mechanics heralds the existence of new paradoxes, such as the 
quantum Zeno effect (Hodges, 2004, p. 54).36 The perseverance of these pre-Socratic 
paradoxes, their reappearance, ever unattainable at the frontier of scientific knowledge, as 
the real which always returns to its place, undermines the validity of the Popperian 
perspective, namely the validity of his doctrine of zero tolerance towards contradiction. 
 
Will I go on to speak of the “genital drive” as the cata-logue of the pre-genital drives 
insofar as they do not contain themselves, but have their cause elsewhere, that is, in 
that Other to which “genitality” only has access inasmuch it takes on a “bar” from the 
division effected by its passage to the major signifier, the phallus? (Lacan, 2001c, p. 
493). 
 
                                                33  γν θι  σεαυτόν  (Know  thyself)  in  contradiction  with  ipse  se  nihil  scire  id  unum 
sciat. 34  Their  paradoxes  aim  to  assert  a  philosophy of  the  one,  of  the  singularity  of  all. These  paradoxes,  formulated  as  critiques  of  pluralist  philosophies,  were  of  with surprising  rigour.  The  paradox  of  complete  divisibility,  for  example,  was  not satisfactorily  resolved  until  Cantor’s  discovery  of  transfinite  and  the  minimal distance discovered by Planck. 35  “Considerations  of  simplicity  and  consistency,  and  dimensional  arguments indicate that the black‐hole entropy is equal to the ratio of the black‐hole area to the square of the Planck length times a dimensionless constant of order unity”... Planck 
length = 1.616 199(97) x 10‐35 m (Bekenstein, 1973). 36 “It is easy to show using standard theory that if a system starts in an Eigenstate of some observable, and measurements are made of that observable N times a second, then, even if the state is not a stationary one, the probability that the system will be in the same state after, say, one second, tends to one as N tends to infinity; that is, that continual observations will prevent motion” (Hodges, 2004, p. 54). 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In reading Three Essays on Sexuality, we see Freud arrive at the lucid conclusion that 
there is no universality in sexual behaviour, no sexual instinct in humans that is not 
reshaped in a singular manner by language. On the one hand, the myriad of possible 
detours in object choice testifies to the non-existence of another where libido naturally 
condenses. On the other, perversions with distortions not at the level of the object, but of 
the aim, indicate that the drives in question do not involve a complete “genital drive”; the 
normative sexual drive reveals itself to be a mirage. After all, not even the so-called 
“normal” sexual relation sustains itself without recourse to the fantasy, by a “psychical 
participation in the transformation of the sexual drive” (Freud, 1962, p. 49). The partial 
object is always there as cause of desire; the fantasy transforms agony and ecstasy to 
pleasure. Moreover, the beloved other is represented mentally with the characteristics of 
idealisation and overestimation (Ibid). 
 
For Freud, “The sexual drive in and of itself is not a simple given fact; it is formed of 
diverse components, which dissociate in cases of perversion” (Ibid). The five Freudian 
cases of psychoanalysis show the pre-eminence of other drives: oral, anal, scopic, and 
invocatory. These pre-genital drives find their cause in the Other, located on the liminal 
spaces of the body of the infant, there where the maternal Other cares for the newborn. 
The pre-genital drives find their cause in the reception this Other offers. It seems access 
to the dialectic of desire and the social bond depend upon the “good enough” reception by 
this Other, as seen in the famous Kleinian case (Klein, 1930). This reception will always 
be uncertain since its “good enough” nature necessitates a minimal distance, a separation; 
this reception would also be in relation with the maternal fantasy. 
 
Therefore, if one wishes to speak of the set of “sexual drives”, it seems one would be 
obliged to admit that this constitutes an empty set. Il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel... in 
other words, there is no normal sexual trieb; any instinct that may have been was 
fractured by the inscription of language in the body, by the genesis of the subject. Just as 
any other formal set, that of the drives obtains no coherent completeness in its totality, 
and above all attains no universality. As such, the so-called genital drive would be 
located where the impossibility of Gödel’s discovery manifests itself. If Freud considered 
the verb ‘love, lieben, as “the expression of the sum total of sexuality”  (Freud, 1915a)37, 
here one runs up against a logical equivoque of the human experience. The tabulation of 
partial drives, the set of the genital drive that would assemble all the pre-genital partial 
drives, itself excepted, is contradictory. This apparent paradox stems from the logical 
equivoque of the drives in the sexual life of man. 
 
And for the transfinite of demand, that is, re-petition, will I return to its only having 
another horizon from giving body to the two, being no less than it inaccessible in only 
beginning with the one which would not be that of the empty set?  (Lacan, 2001c, p. 
493). 
 
                                                37 “Ausdruck der ganzen Sexualstrebung” (Freud, 1915a). 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The repeated petition, that is to say, “the transfinite of demand”, originates from the gap 
between demand, die Forderung, and desire, das Begehren. Satisfaction of demand never 
attains the level of desire. The metonymic object of desire is always elsewhere. “It wasn’t 
really that which I wanted”. The Freudian example of the butcher’s wife’s dream 
elucidates this asymmetry between demand, desire, and want in exemplary form. “This 
patient very much smitten with her husband, what does she demand? It is love, and 
hysterics, like everybody else, demand love, except that for them, it is more of an 
encumbrance. What does she desire? She desires caviar. One need only read. And what 
does she want? She wants not to be given caviar” (Lacan, 1998, p. 364). This vignette 
shows us the disconnect between demand and desire; she wants for her demand not to be 
satisfied in order to be able to continue desiring. In this way, no fulfilment of the demand 
of love ever attains desire, as the tortoise chased by Achilles. 
 
The primordial demand is the infant’s cry of suffering a physiological need. Insofar as the 
Other interprets this primordial cry, the Other transmutes it from biological need into 
demand. By this transformation from need to demand, the child enters into the circuit of 
demand, which consists in a separation that gives the Other its status. From this moment 
on, the child’s life will unfold along the coordinates of a demand aimed at the Other. 
What Lacan names the transfinite of demand involves this horizon, the horizon that 
demand approaches asymptotically, never becoming parallel with desire. This demand 
addressed to the Other lends a dyadic structure. Hence the transferential unconscious of 
psychoanalysis, the unconscious is fundamentally intersubjective. Yet Lacan envisions 
the end, the exit out of analysis by the passage from two to one; from the intersubjective 
nature of the transferential unconscious to the real unconscious in order to arrive at the 
function of the analyst, singular and unique. 
 
The end of analysis 
The obstacle, which the transfinite of demand presents at the end of analysis, appears in 
cases of hysteria, just as obsession, in the transference love of the Other. For the 
obsession neurotic, attempts to go beyond the barrier of demand to his desire are haunted 
by anxiety. Lacan observes that manifestations of obsessive’s desire carry with them a 
certain paradoxically in that they depend upon the Other - as all desire does - but 
simultaneously involve a fading of the Other, a kind of destruction of the Other. “The 
desire of man in so far as it is the desire of the Other, namely that it is beyond the passage 
of the articulation of man’s need in this necessity to make it known to the other, this 
desire in the form of absolute condition, of something which is beyond every satisfaction 
of need, and which is produced in the margin which exists between the demand for the 
satisfaction of need and the demand for love, which is situated there. As such a demand 
contains within it the demand for love, it is a simply fulfilled biological necessity, but a 
demand “which presents the character of an absolute condition, that it is this one and 
same one which I designate to be proper to desire”, and when this fixated demand which 
contains the truth of desire is in play, this “desire as such, namely that in its constitution, 
comprises the destruction of the Other”. Such desire minimizes the Other. Yet, desire is 
always desire of the Other; it is always located in the Other, a logical paradox. “The 
obsessive, insofar as his fundamental movement is directed towards his desire as such, 
and above all in its constitution as desire, implies in every movement towards the 
attainment of this desire what we call the destruction of the Other”. This very destruction 
of the Other renders his desire ephemeral, hesitant. 
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The desire of the obsessive thus “dissimulates beneath the demand of the Other”. The 
obsessive fantasy is that of sustaining the completeness of the Other, which is simply 
another way of saying “the obsessive applies himself to destroying the desire of the 
Other”. The obsessive finds manifestations of the desire of the Other, the desire of the 
analyst, unbearable in all there capriciousness. This paradox “can lead to the 
eternalisation of the cure”. Each time his desire as desire of the Other, or the desire of the 
analyst manifest, the obsessive risks backpedalling before the Other’s lack. The 
unconscious as real in the very last period of Lacan’s though, of Preface to the English 
edition of Seminar XI, announces a radical turning point. There Lacan writes, “The space 
of a lapse, has no significance of meaning (or interpretation), only then is one sure of 
being in the unconscious. One knows it, oneself. But paying it attention suffices for one 
to exit. No amity there, which this unconscious sustains” (Lacan, 2001d). This 
conceptualization of the unconscious is radically devoid of meaning. It is only in the 
nonsensical lapses that the unconscious can be claimed to be present. Moreover, it is no 
longer envisioned as being sustained by the transference relation between the analysand 
and the analyst as a subject supposed to know. Lacan no longer conceives of the 
unconscious as intersubjective, it concerns the solitary analysand, the singular one. 
 
In a final period of his analysis, Bernard Porcheret - recently named AE - experienced an 
“éclaté d’équivoques” during which meaning and the story tale, his fiction, fragmented 
and revealed the hole of non-meaning bordered by the letter. During this time of 
understanding, he dreamt the following dream, which he named ‘the dream of the 
biffure’: “I have before me a vague relief map of northern Spain. My analyst passes by 
me and crosses out a sort of [unintelligible] with a yellow marker. He underlines the 
letters of a name of a town Llógar, written with an accent above the ‘O’. The analyst 
snatches my iphone, I find myself without means of accessing knowledge, I am anxious 
since soon I must intervene about my own case in the improbable scenery of study days. I 
rejoin him further on, the analyst, in order to recover my iphone. Without looking, 
without speaking, he negligently gives me a broken telephone, a child’s plaything”.38 
 
Mr. Porcheret begins the analysis of his dream by telling us that llógar condenses two 
Spanish words lugar, and llegar. On the one hand, “the accent points as an index”, a 
vector towards the destination. On the other hand, it is a crossing-out, LlØgar. The ‘o’ 
could also be read as a hole, a zero, ‘0’. In this case, a hole doubly negated, by its very 
nature and then by the added accent of annulment, the crossing-out. This neologism, 
Llógar anticipates itself somewhat in the French language since the word ‘zéro’ is written 
with this same trace. One can clearly see the Wunsch of the dream in the fact; “soon I 
must intervene about my own case in the improbable scenery of study days”. This very 
testimony of his dream took place at the AE study days on the equivoque. But the 
veritable kernel of the dream is the destitution of the subject supposed to know. The 
enacting of the fall from grace of the transference to the Other. “Without looking, without 
                                                38  «J’ai devant moi une  carte vague des  reliefs du nord de  l’Espagne. Mon analyste passe  à  côté  de  moi  et  fait  une  biffure  avec  une  marquer  jaune  sur  une  sorte de [inaudible]. Il souligne les lettres d’un nom d’une ville Llógar, écrit avec un accent sur le  ‘O’. L’analyste embarque mon Iphone, je me retrouve sans moyens d’accéder au savoir,  je suis angoissé car je dois bientôt intervenir, à propos de ce cas. Dans le décor  improbable  d’une  journée  d’études.  Je  le  rejoins  plus  loin,  l’analyste,  pour récupérer  mon  Iphone.  Sans  regard,  sans  parole,  négligemment  il  me  donne  une téléphone cassé, un jouet d’enfant.» 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speaking, he negligently gives me a broken telephone, a child’s plaything”. It is a dream 
of the passage from the two of the transferential unconscious to the one of the real 
unconscious; where with the mirage Other being the subject supposed to know and the 
“love addressed to knowledge” (Lacan, 2001a) yield to the one without recourse to the 
knowledge of a second. 
 
The end of analysis and the narrow path of the passe involve a logical equivoque. For M. 
Porcheret, “an equivoque on being”.39 It consists in the isolation and consent to a creative 
trace, genitor of the subject unseizable at the level of the signified. A logical equivoque 
between the unconscious meaning of symptoms and the fundamental nonsense of the 
traumatism of the inscription of language in the organism. Furthermore, there is logical 
equivocity in the destitution of the transferential unconscious, of the subject supposed to 
know without which no analytic act exists, and its contradiction, the real of the 
unconscious, ‘Ere’s one40, as the exit point from the analytic experience towards the 
singular. 
 
Bernard Porcheret’s dream constitutes a traversal of the transfinite of the transferential 
unconscious, that of the intersubjectivity of two - the demand ever-directed towards 
another - to the autism of the one of the real unconscious. He awaited the Other’s 
knowledge, but the dream shows the Other is equally deprived of meaning, of an 
anchoring point that would orient the subject. He lends his knowledge to the Other, and 
the other returns the letter. 
 
I want to mark here that there is only a collection there--ceaselessly fed by the 
testimony that those of course whose ears I open give to it--a collection of what 
anyone as well as I and they get from the mouths themselves of analysands however 
little they are authorized to take the place of the analyst (Lacan, 2001c, p. 493). 
  
The passage from analysand to analyst plays out in the singularity of the one. The 
generation of the one does not occur from the basis of addition, of counting one’s 
possessions. It is not through sameness, by the inclusion in the universal, - for example, 
counting sheep, 1, 2, 3, ... ad infinitum. Rather “It is very exactly that, contrary to 
appearance, the One by essence could not be founded on sameness, but it is very 
precisely, on the contrary, by set theory, marked as needing to be founded in pure and 
simple difference” (Lacan, 2011, pp. 110-111). Set theory teaches us the one is founded 
by its absence, a lack. The “pure and simple difference” is, insofar as it concerns the 
analyst, his singularity, the unicity of his linguistic trauma. The one appears from the 
starting point of the lack; regarding the analyst to be, it is from the letter, which causes 
the want-to-be. At the end of the analytic experience, reading desire at the letter passes by 
negation. It requires a refusal to read the letter at the level of meaning, at the level of the 
signified. In a way, it is no longer a case of the signifier either, but of tracing, by the 
combinatory of signifiers, the letter as unit of jouissance. 
                                                39 “une équivoque sur l’être”. 40 “Y’a de l’Un”. 
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That it be simply a question of a herd of domesticated animals does not provide for the 
genesis of the one, it is more the one which lacking in the real, in relation to the expected 
number in the symbolic. To assert this modern mathematical logic took quite the detour 
to find again what was there in the beginning of writing. Not enumeration of worldly 
objects, but starting from the moment when the trace refers to nothing to be found in the 
world. The structure of the number is made to designate what doesn’t exist in the world. 
The same could be said of the letter. It concerns the gap between being and existing. 
 
Conclusion 
Late in his teaching, Lacan will remark, “When all is said and done, equivocation is the 
only weapon we have against the sinthome... In effect, interpretation operates uniquely by 
equivocation. There must be something in the signifier which resonates” (Lacan, 2005, p. 
17). I read Lacan’s quote as an observation that equivocation is the only path for grasping 
the singularity of the subject. It is the true Via regia to the unconscious. Whether it be via 
the analyst’s systematic misunderstanding of the analysand’s discourse, or his 
punctuations which accent the ambiguity of the analysand’s speech, or by repetition or 
other interpretations based around the analysand’s master signifiers, or even the analyst’s 
simple stupidity (Allouch, 2009, p. 81).41 we know the psychoanalytic experience 
advances through incomprehension and surprise; effects of truth occur at the fault lines of 
the lying truth. And of course, if this exclusive function (equivocation →  unconscious) is 
true, which I hold it to be, we soon find ourselves confronting serious questions on the 
nature of this relation. Does the equivocal nature of language itself engender the 
unconscious, ƒ(ε)=$. Alternatively we could formulate it Ł◇$, does the incoherence of 
language as a formal system leads unavoidably to the phenomena of the unconscious, to 
the subjective division? Lacan visits this hypothesis in passing, first saying in “the 
unconscious is structured by language” (1998, p. 65)42 before modifying his thesis, “the 
unconscious is structured like a language” (Lacan, 1990, p. 20). All of these complicated 
questions are fundamentally relevant to psychoanalysis, as they are difficulties 
encountered in reduction of the oppressive over-determined meaning which initially 
causes the subject’s suffering, as well as in deduction of the singular one at the end of the 
psychoanalysis. Attaining the one, the unary trait, constitutes the prime goal, the 
foundation of the psychoanalytic ethic. This is the root of the opposition between ego 
psychology and other cognitive or behavioural approaches on the one hand, which 
                                                
41 “He had to decide. For months and months he had told Lacan of his love for X, talked 
about her, of his relationship with her, of her life. In short, he had completely analysed 
his choice of her…. 
He arrives in the session to declare, finally: 
­ ‘I’m getting married next week.’ 
Lacan: 
­ ‘To whom?’” (Allouch, 2009, p. 81) 42 “Disons que tout ce qui est de  l’ordre de  l’inconscient en tant qu’il est structuré par  le  langage, nous met devant  le phénomène suivant  ‐  ce n’est ni  le  genre, ni  la classe, mais seulement l’exemple particulier qui nous permet de saisir les propriétés les plus significatives” (Lacan, 1998, p. 65). 
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attempt the suppression of the symptom and the normalization of the subject, and 
psychoanalysis on the other, oriented towards the denomination of the one. 
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